was unconstitutionally vague and couldn't be relied on to enhance a sentence.

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But the holding in *Johnson* doesn't implicate the definition of "drug trafficking offense" used by the Sentencing Guidelines, which does not include the residual clause language. A federal sentence may be enhanced based on prior drug conviction when the elements of the prior conviction match the generic definition of a "drug trafficking offense" under federal law. *Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).

Before he was sentenced in this case, Hernandez was convicted of selling cocaine in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11352(a), PSR¹ at 8, and of possessing cocaine for sale in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11351, PSR at 11. Both of his prior offenses match the generic federal definition for a "drug trafficking offense." *See United States v. Huitron-Rocha*, 771 F.3d 1183, 1184 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that modified categorical approach applies to §§ 11351 and 11352(a) offenses); *United States v. Leal-Vega*, 680 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that § 11351 violation qualified as drug trafficking offense under modified categorical approach, where the drug at issue was a Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act).

Johnson is inapposite to Hernandez's case – the Court didn't rely on any version of any "residual clause" in imposing his sentence. His motion is **DENIED**.

ann A. Burn

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS United States District Judge

IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 DATED: October 26, 2016

¹ "PSR refers to the Presentence Report filed in Hernandez's case on June 6, 2013.